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The Neoliberal Underpinnings of the Bioeconomy: the Ideological 
Discourses and Practices of Economic Competitiveness 
 
KEAN BIRCH 
 
Abstract 
 
When we talk about ideology and new genetics we tend to think of concepts like 
geneticisation and genetic essentialism, which present genetics and biology in 
deterministic terms. However, the aim of this article is to consider how a particular 
economic ideology – neoliberalism – has affected the bioeconomy rather than 
assuming that it is the inherent qualities of biotechnology that determine market 
value. In order to do this, the paper focuses on the discourses and practices of 
economic competitiveness that pervade biotechnology policy-making in the UK, 
Europe and the USA. Finally it will consider how the manufacture of scarcity – in 
order to produce the bioeconomy – has led to a problematic focus on a specific 
innovation paradigm that may prove detrimental to the development and distribution 
of new biotechnologies. 
 
Introduction 
 
When we talk about ideology in reference to genetics, we tend to think of concepts 
such as Lippman’s geneticisation1 and Nelkin and Lindee’s genetic essentialism2 that 
emerged during the 1990s. More explicitly, Katz Rothman has stated that “Genetics 
isn’t just a science. It’s becoming more than that. It’s a way of thinking, an 
ideology”,3 and Richard Lewontin has argued that biological determinism is an 
ideology.4 Several other academics have made similar claims,5 whilst this conceptual 
focus on the impact of new genetics technologies on our societies, social relations and 
personal lives has been addressed in numerous studies.6 However, there has been a 
growing number of questioning voices, which both criticise concepts like 
geneticisation and genetic essentialism on the one hand and provide a more ‘positive’ 
analysis of the influence of new genetics on the other. In particular Hedgecoe has 
argued that the concept of geneticisation implicitly identifies genetic technologies in a 
wholly negative light and is therefore in some ways a compromised perspective.7 
Thus whilst geneticisation may provide insight at broad social level it does not 
address the more immediate and personal impacts of the new technologies.8 
Furthermore, other scholars have questioned the empirical basis of geneticisation 
itself, arguing that the evidence for claims that genetics has colonised social life are 
not substantiated by the evidence,9 although research also questions this view as 
well.10 
 
Instead of focusing on the ideological discourses around the biological and genetic 
basis of the bioeconomy, this article argues that economic ideologies have played a 
more significant role in producing the current biotech industry and its market. In 
particular, the ideological discourse of neoliberalism provides a particularly pertinent 
perspective to illustrate how the bioeconomy results from a specific set of economic 
representations and practices.11 This provides a theoretical approach that does not 
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exclude social and political concerns,12 in contrast to genetic ideology arguments 
which Kerr has argued are problematic because: 
 
‘Foregrounding the transformative effects of technologies takes 
attention away from the social circumstances in which they are 
developed, and the extent to which they reinforce old cultural values 
and social arrangements, rather than introduce new ones.’13 
 
There is a very real sense in which the individualisation of new genetics enables 
‘hype’ and promises of future health to promote new technologies and constitute 
specific economic spaces,14 which has important political economic implications for 
the bioeconomy. Thus Fleising and Caulfield (and others) argue that ‘genohype’ has 
an important promotional role in the production of certain visions around these new 
technologies that drives the commercialisation of technoscience.15 
 
In order to produce this analysis it is first necessary to clarify what I describe as 
economic representations and economic practices. The former can be seen as the ways 
we map and pattern a specific set of values onto the description of a particular thing. 
Such representational discourses entail a series of assumptions and expectations about 
the values of actors, groups and even societies. For example, Mitchell argues that 
certain neo-institutional and neoliberal discourses represent a world without ‘property 
rights’ as inherently chaotic.16 Consequently such representations consist of an 
expectation about the world (ie, it describes how the world works) that enables action 
to be undertaken (ie, people know what will happen when they act in the world). 
Furthermore, in their work on the sociology of technological expectations Brown and 
Michael claim that this tendency to fetishise the “soon to be” naturalises current 
actions by making them appear as the obvious and therefore inevitable solution to a 
particular problem.17 However, the diversity and variety of representational 
discourses means that the world they describe leads by necessity to certain practices
that they also pre
 
scribe.  
 
Whether the discourse describes a ‘concrete’ world is irrelevant in the justification for 
these practices because there is no need for a link to be made between the description 
and prescription because the latter is always one-step removed. Our experience of our 
practices occurs after our experience of its representation because we have acted upon 
an expectation about the world. When there is a fracture between the two, this can be 
easily re-represented in new terms that re-naturalise and re-justify any dissonance 
between such representations and practices. What is notable, however, is that this 
process can produce self-fulfilling prophecies in which social actors acting upon the 
representation of the world reinforce their expectations through their performance.18 
This performance makes such actors appear predictable and therefore trustworthy, 
although only because they reinforce a particular description.19 
 
In order to explore these issues, this article builds on this outline of how 
representations and practices operate together to produce legitimating mechanisms for 
particular policies that then produce a self-fulfilling prophecy as practices are 
naturalised and normalised. The example used to illustrate this argument is the policy 
discourse around the importance of competitiveness in the bioeconomy and how this 
has naturalised and justified policy changes to institutions directly impacting the 
biotech innovation system. I argue that the concept of neoliberalism helps to explain 
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how we might understand the discourses and practices underpinning bioeconomy as 
part of a particular economic ideology. Finally I will consider how this ideology has 
impacted the bioeconomy. 
 
Neoliberal underpinnings of the bioeconomy 
 
The work of Karl Polanyi on the embeddedness of markets and economic activity in 
social relations provides a useful approach to adopt when considering the 
bioeconomy.20 Rather than rejecting the insights of economic sociology and 
economic anthropology, it is worth taking into account the important place that 
‘choice’ plays in market economies and how choice is manufactured through the 
production of scarcity. According to Polanyi the ‘formal’ side of economics
to means-end relationships is tied to such choice. This is achieved through the 
withholding of resources via either “Nature or Law” leading to the “introduction of 
purchasing power as a means of acquisition” which then “converts the process of 
meeting requirements into an allocation of insufficient means with alternative use
namely, money”.
 relating 
s, 
ts 
pt as the result of induced 
arcity. 
o 
t 
 
e 
 
 which was instead characterised by a form of 
eynesian ‘embedded liberalism’.24 
 
lism 
21 Central to this process is the control of access to production inpu
(eg, labour) and distributional outputs (eg, markets) through mechanisms such as 
intellectual property. It is especially crucial to note that markets are based on the 
relationship between people rather than people and resources, which means that 
scarcity and therefore market value is manufactured through the acquisition of a 
resource by a person(s) and the exclusion from the same resource for other people. 
Thus market value is not based on any intrinsic quality of the resource itself nor, 
therefore, on any ability to calculate its market value exce
sc
 
What this means for the bioeconomy is that the political economy of biotechnology – 
ie, how it is organised as a market – can be seen as the consequence of the expansion 
of specific economic discourses and practices. In particular, the bioeconomy is tied t
the rise of neoliberalism as the dominant mode of governance. Neoliberalism itself 
developed as an economic ideology for two major reasons. First, it was a response to 
the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Second, it resulted from 
a concern with the ‘problem of knowledge’ in economic calculation, which meant tha
a centrally-planned market was not seen as plausible.22 The term itself was coined in
1938 at a meeting in Paris of liberal intellectuals – including the likes of von Mises 
and Hayek – who focused on “the redefinition of the functions of the state” to ensur
the development of freedom and property rights (ie, market ethics) and contrasted 
with the nineteenth century laissez faire liberal tradition based on removing state 
intervention altogether.23 It also had a strong international dimension in seeking to
promote peace and freedom through international economic exchange. This early 
movement was cemented after World War II with the establishment of the Mont 
Pelerin Society in 1947, although neoliberalism itself failed to dominate economic 
discourse during the post-war period,
K
 
It was not until the ‘fiscal crises’ of the early 1970s and especially the erosion and
subsequent collapse of the Bretton Woods system that neoliberalism became the 
dominant political economic perspective.25 The growing influence of neolibera
can be seen as the consequence of the amalgamation of a number of strands of 
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political economic thought such as monetarism, rational expectations, supply-side
economics and public choice.
 
 
l 
 proved crucial 
 
novation and technological change central to the analysis of the bioeconomy. 
nto 
f 
 we 
ugh specific policy 
rocesses and what implications this has for the bioeconomy. 
 
 
 
ars have 
r 
ly, 
ilding 
led 
s of governance “in order to impose market 
le upon all aspects of social life”.36  
 that 
rticular 
26 Allied to this array of theories, and crucial to the
expansion of neoliberalism, were a range of new and established organisations, 
foundations and associations, including the Institute of Economic Affairs (est.1955) in 
the UK and the World Economic Forum (est.1971), that helped to expound neolibera
perspectives.27 Furthermore, the problematisation of knowledge also
because it laid the foundations for the ascendancy of the “logics of 
competitiveness”,28 which is evident in the economic and policy debates around
in
 
There is a dual process at work here underpinning much of the competitiveness 
discourse around the bioeconomy and its simultaneous practice. On the one hand 
practices (eg, patenting) must encourage and promote innovation and the capacity of 
commercial actors to enter (ie, make) new markets so that the market can spread i
new areas of life. On the other hand innovation has to be represented as a natural 
process in which ‘fitness’ (ie, success) is (re)presented as a consequence of inherent 
and endogenous competitiveness thereby justifying and naturalising a specific set o
practices.29 Thus innovation has to be presented as the consequence of innate and 
internal characteristics because competitiveness would otherwise merely represent the 
application of power – eg, the ability to spend more on innovation, the ability to bully 
other countries during trade negotiations, etc.30 If we take the latter point seriously
have to consider how this has been instigated and pursued thro
p
 
These processes can be seen as part of a shift identified by Jessop and others from a 
Keynesian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime.31
More simply this can be classified as the rise of a neoliberal regime in which market
values are installed as the over-riding ethic in society.32 There is a growing body of
work in economic geography, in particular, along with other disciplines exploring 
these processes. With neoliberalism defined as the “mobilization of state power in the 
contradictory extension and reproduction of market(-like) rule”,33 these schol
mapped out a number of distinct phases. Peck and Tickell, for example, have 
described three stages starting with ‘proto-neoliberalism’ in the 1970s, which sought 
to establish the philosophical basis for free markets and thereby influence economic 
thinking in academic and policy debates. The subsequent mobilisation of state powe
initiated the ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ of the 1980s, which focused on deregulation 
and privatisation across institutions previously tied to Keynesian principles. Final
the economic contradictions inherent in the neoliberal project led to the ‘roll-out 
neoliberalism’ of the 1990s in which government intervention and institution bu
is directly tied into new forms of governance.34 Thus the state’s current role is 
characterised as a facilitator of market forces, which contrasts with the claims that the 
state is ‘withering away’ or ‘hollowing out’,35 and consequently neoliberalism has 
to new disciplinary and coercive mode
ru
 
As mentioned above, neoliberalism arose from an array of theories and concepts
have enormous influence in both competitiveness discourse and practice. In an 
especially interesting analysis of this second ‘great transformation,’ Blyth details the 
multiple strands of thought that helped to produce neoliberal ideology.37 Of pa
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interest are the links between economists like Hayek and von Mises and early 
proponents of the ‘knowledge economy’ thesis, such as Fritz Machlup, Daniel
and Michael Polanyi.
 Bell 
 the 
 policy action and change at the same time 
at action in other areas is denigrated.  
n 
 
 
43 
igher 
e, the 
 
 
y 
s that the marginal returns from 
rivate investment produce monopoly profits.47 
ompetitiveness in discourse and practice 
epresentations of the bioeconomy: policy discourse on competitiveness 
 
 
omy’.48 In 
38 The 1990s revival of such concepts as the knowledge 
economy with their implicit links between innovation and competitiveness are worth 
considering in light of these earlier neoliberal assumptions and arguments around
role of knowledge.39 Thus playing out across these arguments is the legitimating 
discourse of economic development that permeates the bioeconomy as the Triple 
Helix model of Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff illustrates.40 Neoliberal concepts and 
theories therefore serve to show how institutional features of markets have a crucial 
impact on innovation and can be sites of
th
 
In this sense we can see that the biotech market has not developed in response to the 
intrinsic qualities of new genetics; nor have the new genetic technologies developed 
in response to their own intrinsic qualities. Instead biotechnology fits squarely withi
the broader move from Keynesian economics to neoliberalism. Such a move is not 
automatic and has been described by Harvey as a “utopian project…[and] a political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elites”.41 There are a number of institutional discourses and practices that
legitimate and enact this neoliberal project,42 producing the scarcity needed to ensure
the manufacture of a market for new genetic technologies. According to both Bud
and Loeppky44 biotechnology promised potentially huge returns for investors, a 
promise that was then embedded in specific institutional forms like the ‘dedicated 
biotech firm’ (DBF). This is because such small and ‘innovative’ firms (ie, those 
benefiting from public investment in science and policy changes) produce h
returns because any technological ‘breakthrough’ or promise has a greater 
proportional impact on their market value than for any large firm.45 Furthermor
political economy of biotechnology is built on the back of monopoly profits in 
markets established by policies designed to stimulate innovation (eg, the US Orphan
Drugs Act in 1983) through the production of scarcity in a market characterised by 
increasing returns to scale.46 Thus the scientific infrastructure provided by massive
historical and contemporary public spending on biomedicine means that the high, 
fixed costs of biomedical research precludes the pursuit of such endeavours by an
single firm, no matter how large, but also ensure
p
 
C
 
R
 
The central aim here is to outline the emphasis in policy discourse on the 
revolutionary impact that genetics, genomics and other ‘modern’ biotechnologies
have had and will have on our society, polity and, increasingly, our economy. In
particular I want to illustrate the ongoing concern with competitiveness before 
showing how this has been constituted through deliberate policy action. Recent 
examples of this discourse include the debates in the European Commission and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development on the ‘bioecon
one instance, the EU Science and Research Commissioner claims that the 
‘knowledge-based bio-economy’ is worth in the region of €1.5 trillion annually and 
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that consequently it is an important “driver of growth and competitiveness”.49 In t
the OECD aims to examine the “policies needed to promote and exploit this new 
wave of innovations to promote high-level social and economic goals”.
urn 
ver, 
logy and the improvement of national healthcare, primarily, alongside other 
sues.51  
e 
d Growth 
.52 
is 
s of 
 
90s.55 
 broader term – with economic competitiveness and from this 
ational well-being.56  
ing 
 has 
 
build 
but 
sful in 
al 
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an questionable policy strategy.60 Others have been more cautious though.61 
 
tes in 
 
ces 
50 Howe
such discourse also emphasises a strong link between the economic success of 
biotechno
is
 
Such concerns with innovation, growth and competitiveness are reiterated in th
policy discourse of the UK national and devolved governments. The former is 
particularly evident in the terms of reference of the Bioscience Innovation an
Team (BIGT) to “identify and clarify the issues that are critical to the future 
competitiveness of the UK biosciences sector”, especially in relation to healthcare
There is again a clear association between national competitiveness and national 
healthcare in the policy discourse throughout the BIGT report.53 A key element in th
discourse is the identification of successful innovation and particularly the fruit
healthcare R&D like biopharmaceuticals. Consequently a number of mapping 
exercises have been pursued by the DTI and other organisations such as EuropaBio, 
the European trade organisation.54 These build upon earlier policy reports such as the
Biotech Clusters and Genome Valley produced by the DTI at the end of the 19
However, what sets the later analyses apart is the clearer identification of the 
biosciences – in itself a
n
 
At both the devolved and regional level there is also a strong emphasis on the 
importance of the biosciences in policy discourse, in part inspired by the continu
‘knowledge economy’ claims that permeate much of this debate. Almost all the 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), for example, have some policy drive to 
promote the biosciences, biotechnology, life sciences etc. In particular Scotland
developed a Scottish Life Sciences Strategy with the explicit aim to construct a 
“globally focused, sustainable life sciences sector” that is less concerned with national
healthcare per se and instead concentrates on competitiveness.57 Such activities 
upon earlier activities that Scottish policy-makers (eg, Scottish Enterprise) had 
developed such as the 1999 ‘cluster’ strategy; this covered not only biotechnology 
other ‘knowledge’ sectors as well.58 A number of initiatives were undertaken as a 
consequence of such policy discourse, not all of which were necessarily succes
promoting innovation or competitiveness.59 The cluster-promoting strategy is 
reproduced in regional policy discourse in England as well with a number of region
organisations and bodies presenting the biotech cluster as a self-evident fact rat
th
 
It is important to note that this policy discourse is neither new nor unique to the UK,
or to Europe and the USA. We can find examples of much earlier policy deba
the UK, and there are numerous instances of such concerns in European and 
American policy circles. In fact there appears to be an ongoing concern with the 
performance of the US that permeates European policy discourse to the extent that the
US biotechnology industry has achieved an almost ‘mythic’ status.62 Early instan
of this fear of lost competitiveness can be found in the UK with the 1980 Spinks 
Report explicitly identifying a number of national competitors like the US, West 
Germany, France and Japan. Again the report characterises biotechnology (and not 
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the biosciences or life sciences) as an “area of high technology with large potential 
growth offering opportunities” that necessitates swift action to “both remove these 
[constraints] and to promote biotechnology”.63 A later House of Lords report, from 
the early 1990s, claims that the UK biotech industry has a “competitive disadvan
over the US and Japan in particular and again emphasises the “enormous future 
benefits to mankind”.
tage” 
,65 
 in 
the possibility of “losing 
ut on a novel field with immense commercial impact”.67  
rse 
The 
r 
ot 
ss 
s 
fter country 
eregulates in order to avoid any form of competitive disadvantage.70 
ractices of the bioeconomy: manufacturing scarcity 
ing 
ad 
ed to 
e 
other policies in order to enable the competitiveness of US firms in global markets. 
64 There is little difference in early US policy discourse
which, once it had moved beyond concerns with safety, concentrated on the 
commercialisation of biotechnology and the competitive position of the US
comparison to other countries.66 Even as early as 1977 the US Senate was 
highlighting the main risk in the biotechnology industry as 
o
 
Both policy and academic debates define the concept of competitiveness as ‘success’ 
in international markets.68 Consequently competitiveness itself represents a discou
that justifies and naturalises the pursuit of specific policies that ensure success in 
these markets through the (re)constitution of national institutional frameworks. 
representation of the biosciences as a driver of competitiveness throughout the 
regional, national and supranational policy discourses can be seen as a process in 
which biotechnology has been presented as an obvious and perhaps even inevitable 
solution to such policy concerns. The more recent link between competitiveness and 
national well-being or healthcare embeds this competitiveness concern in the intrinsic 
attributes of biotechnology itself so that the previous emphasis on the bioeconomy 
appears rational and obvious;69 who does not want better drugs or less pollution afte
all? Competitiveness can therefore be presented as technologically determined and 
dependent upon innovation, which leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy as changes made 
to institutional structures to encourage bioscience innovation benefit all firms and n
just national ones. In this way the external threat presented in the competitivene
discourse becomes concrete as external firms can enter newly (institutionally) 
deregulated markets more easily than firms based in those markets because the latter 
have to adapt to new institutions whilst the former do not because they have not been 
embedded in the previous institutional environment. Furthermore the emphasis on the 
need to continually upgrade technology through innovation in order to compete lead
to the gradual expansion and privatisation of global capital as country a
d
 
P
 
The policy discourse around innovation and competitiveness has led to the embedd
of a number of specific institutional changes in the US bioeconomy that have h
enormous influence on other countries. At least three such components to the 
competitiveness regime have been naturalised as necessary policy changes intend
ensure success in the bioeconomy. First and foremost was the ability to capture 
returns on the new biotechnologies arising out of public and private laboratories. In 
particular the clarification of whether living organisms could be patented was crucial 
and had been an ongoing saga between 1971 and 1980 in relation to the Diamond vs. 
Chakrabarty case.71 Second, there was a need to enable the capture of public scienc
funded by the US federal government and thereby exclude others from its benefits. 
Finally there was an increased emphasis on the international dimensions of all these 
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Consequently a number of trade-related policies such as the TRIPS agreement at the 
WTO were vigorously pursued. 
 
In order to capture the results of this new technological saviour of the US economy, 
policy-makers had to wait until 1980 when the Supreme Court ruling on the Diamond 
vs. Chakraberty case enabled the patenting of genetically-engineered living 
organisms.72 In particular, it upheld a broad patent covering biotechnology 
specifically.73 Subsequent to this decision the Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
gradually eased its stand on patenting animals so that by 1988 Harvard was able to 
patent the Oncomouse.74 A more deliberate policy decision was the establishment of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, which was the 
dedicated final appeal court in patent cases.75 As a consequence of the establishment 
of the CAFC, patent cases were increasingly found in favour of the patent holder.76 A 
number of important decisions by CAFC in the 1990s enabled patent claims to cover 
both product and process and, more importantly, enabled research processes to be 
patented because utility claims were extended to cover future use in research.77 
Subsequent to these rulings the USPTO amended its guidelines in 2001 so that utility 
could be ‘theoretical’ thereby blurring the line between research and 
commercialisation.78 
 
Over a similar time period US policy-makers sought to encourage the 
commercialisation of new science and technologies developed by public organisations 
like universities. In particular, two major acts in 1980 were aimed at ensuring the 
capture of public science by commercial firms. First, the Bayh-Dole Act helped to 
stimulate technology transfer policies in the US and in other countries.79 It aimed to 
remove limits on the patenting and licensing of federally-funded research undertaken 
by universities and small businesses; it was subsequently extended to large businesses 
in 1983.80 Second, the Stevenson-Wydler Act encouraged the transfer of technology 
from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by setting up an office for such activity 
and providing information on research as well.81 There were a number of other 
important policy decisions that cemented these changes, reinforcing their impact on 
the commercialisation of publicly funded research, especially in relation to 
biomedicine; an illustrative selection of these is outlined in table I. 
 
 
Table I. Examples of competitiveness policy initiatives in the USA82 
 
Date Policy Effect 
1982 Small Business Innovation Development Act 
Required federal funders to allocate 1.25% of R&D 
budgets to small and medium enterprises. 
1984 National Cooperative Research Act 
Relaxed antitrust rules for joint ventures on research. 
Subsequently extended in 1989 to production, 
manufacturing and marketing of co-operative R&D. 
1986 Federal Technology Transfer Act 
Created Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements (CRADA) that enabled firms to access 
publicly funded research  
1995 Biotechnology Process Patent Act 
Restricted foreigners from using the processes 
involved in products patented in the US. 
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The final component of the competitiveness regime was in some ways the most 
important because it dealt with the ability of US firms to compete in international 
markets. Again, a number of policy decisions were made that provided a trading 
advantage for US firms. In particular the Trade Act established a series of processes 
called 301 and 301 Special that enabled the US to withdraw favourable trade status 
from those countries that it deemed not to have fulfilled certain demands on 
intellectual property rights (IPR).83 Such policies were institutionalised in the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1988) when they became public law. These 
processes meant that countries refusing to adhere to US demands could be threatened 
with trade restrictions.84 Such international activities designed to promote US 
interests were pursued through multilateral trade negotiations as well. The most 
important being the World Trade Organisation (WTO) which introduced the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) measures. Article 27 of TRIPS 
meant that all signatories had to enforce biotech patents, whilst Article 33 harmonised
patents to a 20-year minimum where non-compliance would entail the loss of trade 
85
 
 
rivileges.  
 
 
 
sts to 
iscourses and 
d, in particular, are they detrimental to 
chnoscientific development? 
plications of the neoliberal bioeconomy 
ess, 
in the 
f which I will outline one here: the impact on technoscientific 
evelopment. 
p
 
The policy decisions and their repercussions above illustrate the basis for the 
theoretical claim that scarcity produces markets and that such scarcity has to be 
manufactured where it does not already exist. If we accept Polanyi’s argument on this 
point then we can show that the practice of the bioeconomy produces scarcity through
the demarcation of aspects of the world (eg, biology, genetics) as economic domains 
that can be incorporated into existing markets or as new markets perhaps with unique
characteristics. However, this manufacture of scarcity has to be legitimated in terms 
of both social value (ie, societal relations) and market value (ie, economic calculation)
in a continual process that naturalises both the current and previous value status.86 In 
this sense the policy discourse around the competitiveness of the bioeconomy exi
naturalise the past investment of energy and resources into new genetics and the 
continuing investment that is being made. In this case the naturalisation of the past 
investment naturalises the present investment, which, in turn, naturalises the positing 
of future potential.87 In which case, what are the implications of these d
practices for the bioeconomy an
te
 
Im
 
The underlying tenet of neoliberalism is the extension of the market ethic into all 
areas of social, political and economic life, both as a disciplining mechanism for 
achieving efficiency in economic activity and as a moral code promoting liberty 
through private property. Consequently the discourse and practice of competitiven
tied as it is to neoliberal precepts, promotes the collapse of a distinction between 
market value and ethical value so that commercial value becomes the overriding 
principle for political economy (ie, how we organise economic exchange). We can 
therefore identify a number of detrimental effects that neoliberalism can have 
bioeconomy, o
d
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The effect of neoliberalism on technoscience is evident in the current ‘productivi
crisis’ in the biomedical (pharmaceutical and biotechnology) industry. Over the la
few years a number of commentators, academics and policy-makers have raised 
concerns about this productivity crisis. In particular Nightingale and Martin have 
questioned the ‘revolutionary’ claims around biotechnology,
ty 
st 
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itional chemical drugs does not 
ecessarily provide the solution to this problem because of the difficulties in 
 
ber 
rug 
ly 
ns have come to dominate drug 
evelopment to such an extent that they explain around 30% of drug development 
s 
 a 
 of 
l of 
 
hnology 
products have predominantly been “for rare diseases with small markets” or more 
88 although such 
concerns are also evident in policy and trade circles. The FDA, for example, prod
a report in 2004 outlining several problematic features of the pharmaceutical 
innovation system,89 whilst similar concerns have been raised in the trade 
publications like Genetic Engineering News (GEN) and Modern Drug Discovery 
(MDD).90 The productivity crisis itself relates to the decline in new drug approvals 
concomitant with rising R&D expenditure by biomedical firms. Martin et al argue 
that it is a global crisis that has resulted from industry lock-in to an “innovative 
paradigm focused on incremental innovation and the pursuit of blockbuster markets” 
rather than because of over-regulation.91 Furthermore, the growing number of new 
biopharmaceutical approvals that have replaced trad
n
integrating new genetic and genomic technologies into the existing paradigm.92
 
Although the blockbuster model is problematic in relation to the integration of 
modern biotechnology (eg, pharmacogenetics) and the focus on both a limited num
of drug targets and incremental innovation, it has proved particularly profitable for the 
biomedical industry, including biotech companies such as Amgen and Genentech, 
which have more recently expanded their research efforts in chemistry and the pursuit 
of small-molecule drugs.93 A market report by McKinnon et al questions the very 
basis of the productivity crisis itself by arguing that although the number of new d
approvals may not be rising significantly, profits have been impressive. For example, 
the number of blockbuster drugs has risen from 25 in 1998 to 64 in 2003 and the 
potential revenue from each new drug has risen by 57% in the same period.94 Thus it 
has been argued that the consequence of growing R&D expenditure is not necessari
a productivity crisis, but rather that commercial reaso
d
‘failures’ in 2000 compared with only 5% in 1991.95 
 
It is evident that competitiveness (ie, the pursuit of market returns) has come to 
dominate biomedical industry strategies and consequently technoscientific 
development. However, another pressing issue is whether modern biotechnology ha
challenged existing innovation strategies and thereby improved on existing healthcare 
provision through the introduction of new products, or whether it is also stuck in
particular paradigm. To explore this issue it is useful to consider several criticisms
both mainstream pharmaceutical and biotech drugs in relation to their technical 
‘quality.’ With pharmaceuticals, Hubbard and Love have shown that of the drugs 
approved by the FDA between 1989 and 2000 only 23% were better than existing 
products.96 However, a similar trend has also been identified in relation to the leve
therapeutic advance of biopharmaceuticals. For example, Arundel and Mintzes claim 
that only 33% of biopharmaceuticals introduced between 1986 and 2004 showed 
‘some advance’ or more,97 whilst Joppi et al claim that only 25% of biotech products 
approved by EMEA between 1995 and 2003 “represented therapeutic innovation”.98
Perhaps the most significant element in this disappointing return is that biotec
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simply that “they just plain don’t work”.99 Overall the complexity of modern 
biotechnology – from gene therapy to stem cells – has so far precluded extensive 
commercialisation by a biomedical industry still wedded to blockbuster drugs.100 
onclusion 
ear 
, as 
ing 
oth 
enetic-reductionism’ and ‘economic-reductionism’ as McAfee highlights.106  
s’ or 
cal 
ce of 
the result of any 
herent qualities of new genetics and modern biotechnology. 
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C
 
The competitiveness agenda that drives the ‘competitive state’ entails the re-
regulation of markets and societies to enable them to produce economic value and 
growth,101 especially in relation to the bioeconomy.102 Consequently it may app
contradictory to apply a concept like neoliberalism, based as it is on the idea of 
market forces, to the biotech industry. However, that is because neoliberalism itself is 
inherently contradictory implying both state ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out’ of regulation
Peck and Tickell argue, as well as the wedding of state power to the extension of 
markets.103 This involves the removal of certain regulations and the imposition of 
others. In the former case there is the increasing relaxation in pharmaceutical test
regimes highlighted by Abraham and Reed,104 whilst the latter is exemplified in 
increasingly stringent intellectual property (IP) regimes.105 Furthermore, biotech IP 
has been itself framed within an explicitly neoliberal framework that endorses b
‘g
 
In a sense then there is a self-fulfilling prophecy at work with regards to market value 
(ie, returns on investment) rather than other forms of value such as ‘innovativenes
‘efficacy’. The ideological discourse of neoliberalism legitimates and naturalises 
policy processes that have been introduced and encouraged to produce market value 
from biotechnology, which does not then have to ensure practices of social or ethi
value contained in these discourse. Thus the current concern with the efficacy of 
biotech products,107 the ‘productivity crisis’ in pharmaceuticals,108 or the impact of 
new genetics on competitiveness and healthcare109 can be seen as the consequen
the pursuit of a neoliberal discourses and practices, rather than 
in
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